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Will (Villie—noun; ville—verb; Villen—verbal noun)
From the Old Danish  willi  or  williæ  or  wilia, Old Norse  vili  or  vilja-. The lexical
meaning of the Danish term is the capacity or trait of being able to make choices,
or to arrive at and stick to a decision, or purpose, which might manifest itself in
behavior. Qualified, it names a capacity or trait or state or activity of the soul. It
can  also  just  mean  predisposition,  need,  wish,  self-assertion,  stubbornness,
demand, or command.1
The term figures most prominently in Philosophical Fragments,  then The
Concept of Anxiety, The Sickness unto Death, Either/Or (pseudonymous works),
and Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits and Works of Love (signed works).
There are also some remarks in his journals and notebooks, but nowhere in the
Kierkegaardian  corpus do  we  find  an  in-depth,  hands-on  discussion  of  the
concept itself, as with terms such as “anxiety” or “love.” To speak of a concept of
will in Kierkegaard involves some reconstruction.   
†  Author's version. Please do not quote or cite.
1Ordbog over det Danske Sprog, vols. 1-28, published by the Society for Danish Language and 
Literature, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1918-56, vol. 26, columns 1579-1604.
(1) The basic conceptual requirement of will is that there is something up to us, in
our  power,  as opposed to  what  we are unable to  influence or  do something
about, or what just happens anyway either by force or luck. This is tied (2) to
negative possibility (not only willing this thing or in this way but not willing it), and
(3)  to  the  counterfactual  (that  one  could  have  willed  or  done otherwise).  (4)
Consciousness  is  bound  to  be  involved  too,  then  (self-awareness,  being
conscious  of  various  possibilities,  not  just  intending  what  is  at  hand).  This
scheme (1)-(4) underlies both intellectualist and voluntarist defenses of the will,
as well as the distinction between first-order agency (words and deeds) and that
of the second-order (psychological states, existential orientation or choice). For
the intellectualist the will  is not merely dependent on the intellect, or practical
reason, or deliberation; it is a direct expression or epiphenomenon of these. The
voluntarist denies this, claiming it is the will that most deeply characterizes the
self instead.2 Kierkegaard follows this scheme (1)-(4) throughout his writings, and
he is best seen as (5) a voluntarist. Ultimately though, his focus lies elsewhere:
(6) with a Christian existentialist notion of willing only the good.
I. What Is Up To Us
The  Sophists  were  the  first  to  narrow  in  on  what’s  voluntary  or  deliberate
(hekousan;  hekontôn),  sparking  off  the  whole  debate  on how free  agency is
2 Cf. “Will, the”, by Thomas Pink, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward Craig, 
London and New York: Routledge 1998, volume 9, pp. 720-25.
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linked to chance, force, duress, weakness, ignorance, and blame.3 It is only with
the Church father Augustine though that the will  becomes an explicit  concept
(Latin,  voluntas) and a comprehensive theory is worked out. For it is only here
that will  becomes the driving force behind all  consciousness and action, both
human and divine.4 In the “Interlude” of Philosophical Fragments, Climacus takes
up  this  view:  everything  that  happens  has  a  cause  and  this  in  turn  can  be
traced  back  to  a  freely  acting  cause  (fritvirkende  Aarsag),  either  of  the
relative or absolute kind.5 
The discussion is quite articulate: all coming to be is a transition, a change
or movement from possibility to actuality. Every transition happens by freedom
(Frihed)—a freely  acting  cause.  This  is  so  in  the  realms  of  both  nature  and
history. Whereas natural creatures are rooted in the present moment, historical
agents have a double aspect (or plurality of possibilities), allowing them to be
oriented towards the future and the past as well.  Necessity is excluded on all
counts because what is necessary simply  is and so cannot come to be at all.
Seeing the historical as necessary then is an illusion: all deception is will-based.
3 Gorgias (DK A26, B11, 11a). Antiphon’s second and third tetralogies is one, long reflection on
these matters. They are also dramatized by Greek tragedy—Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex above all. 
4 For  will  as the motive  power  of  the human and divine  mind:  Confessiones  (book  13);  De
Trinitate (esp. books 9-12); as basis of human action (good and bad): De Libero Arbitrio; as the
driving force in  human society and history  as a whole:  De Civitate Dei  (esp.  books 14 -15).
Augustine even thinks the will controls human physiology and spatial movement (De Genesi ad
Litteram, book 8). See also Narve Strand, “Augustine on Predestination and Divine Simplicity,”
Studia Patristica, vol. 38, 2001, pp. 290-305.  
5SKS 4, 272-87 / PF, 72-89.
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Chance is excluded too, by inference, both because first-order and second-order
agency are free and because natural causes all end in an absolute freely acting
cause anyway. Everything basically happens by an act of will (Villies-Akt).
II. Negative Possibility
Will involves spontaneity. Being something that happens or is done by our own
initiative,  what  is  voluntary  cannot  be  forced.  To  be  forced  to  will  is  a
contradiction in terms. Spontaneity is not enough though: without the ability to
break off an act of will, or forestall it at least, the voluntary becomes something
natural or automatic and in a sense necessary again. Climacus is alive to this
when he talks about the will as a freely acting cause of plural possibilities. He
then goes on to say that in the transition to reality (or action) possibilities may not
only be assumed but may also be excluded (udelukket), being seen as nothing or
made into nothing (tilintetgjort) by us in the very moment of realization (or acting).
This is proof, he thinks, that human agency is not necessitated or constrained.6   
III. The Counterfactual
An obvious objection here would be to point out ways in which we are not fully
free (that is, being subject to external force or pressure, involuntary movements,
pain, cognitive disorders, and so on). None of this is fully up to us, and negative
possibility makes even less sense here, and so how can any of this be said to be
voluntary? The best way to answer this is to say it is still voluntary but in a limited
way.  Even  if  we  have  no real  control  over  nature  or  the  acts  of  others,  we
6Ibid.
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ourselves produce the conscious states we experience (being hit versus feeling
the pain, say). Talk of responsibility and blame, regardless, should only attach to
that  part  of  human agency that  is  fully  voluntary.  Kierkegaard  is  not  all  that
interested in the physiological and perceptual aspects of the will, but something
like a grading of the voluntary does seem implied in the whole discussion in the
Fragments. The proper sphere of the will is freedom for Kierkegaard: only insofar
as we are freely acting causes, with plural possibilities, does it make sense to
speak of our willing or doing otherwise.
IV. Consciousness and Understanding
That Kierkegaard admits gradations in the will is also clear from The Sickness
unto Death. Here, being a self is based on having a will, and the more will one
exercises,  the  more  self-consciousness  (Selvbevidsthed)  one  is  also  said  to
possess. The will  is  the self in a way and its understanding and freedom are a
function  of  self-relating.7 Anti-Climacus  is  acknowledging  here  that
consciousness is at bottom the work of the will, which is not just the moving force
in human interaction. The point is made openly in the appendix of the second
chapter where Socratic intellectualism is rejected.8 Although there is always an
inner  relation between consciousness and will,  one cannot simply equate the
two:  one  cannot  blame  wrongdoing  on  simple  ignorance  (Uvidenhed)  for
example. I may actively work to blunt or obscure my knowledge (Erkjendelse) of
what  is  right  or  true.  Also,  there  is  always  going  to  be  a  gap  between
7SKS 11, 129, 145 / SUD, 13, 29.
8SKS 11, 201-8 / SUD, 87-96.
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understanding  something  and  actually  doing  it.  Therefore,  conscious
understanding may be highly complex and indispensable to human agency, but it
is  still  the will  that steers it  and that acts as a bridge between the individual
and the world for Kierkegaard.
V. Voluntarism
Given  (1)-(4)  above,  a  good  case  can  be  made  for  why  Kierkegaard  is  a
voluntarist. Will for Kierkegaard is not only the freely acting cause that links up
possibility  and  actuality,  thought  and  action;  it  moves  the  self.  That  he  is  a
voluntarist is also clear from the fact that he gives the intellect, practical reason,
and deliberation at best supporting roles in human life. Again, it is the will that
steers and shapes the understanding, not the other way around. He seems to
think ethical action is pretty straightforward: everyone knows intuitively what is
the right thing to do in any given situation and no real conflicts or doubts are
possible that would make deliberation necessary, much less the deciding factor.9
Last, in an existential and religious sense at least it is the baptism of will (Villiens
Daab)  that  counts.10 Long,  drawn-out  reflection  here  is  an  excuse  for  not
choosing or acting and therefore engenders a kind of irresponsibility—bad faith
even.11 The  Kierkegaardian  corpus does  not  really  leave  room for  a  positive
take on practical reason.12   
9For example, SKS 23, 336, NB19:12 / JP 3, 2874.     
10SKS 3, 166 / EO2, 169.
11Ibid.
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VI. Willing Only the Good
This brings out Kierkegaard’s real concerns in his talk about the will. If we stick to
the  difference  between  first-order  and  second-order  agency,  and  between  a
psychological  and  existential  gloss  on  the  latter,  then  we  can  say  that  the
Kierkegaardian corpus as a whole is primarily interested in the latter. The will is
not at bottom an act of the psyche or a bodily state for Kierkegaard but rather a
spiritual orientation, a way of seeing and relating to one’s life as a whole. 13 When
key elements of the voluntary like decision (Afgjørelse) and resolve (Beslutning)
are brought into play, they are also given this broader, existential meaning. That
is why he can say that to think we can stand back from and decide between
orientations is a fallacy. We are always already relating to life in  some way or
other;  wanting to stand back and choose from a neutral  point  of  view is  like
wanting to have no will. This is as absurd for Kierkegaard as being forced to will.
Even if  he defends freedom of  will  (libertas voluntatis),  he  ends up rejecting
freedom of  choice (liberum arbitrium)  in the sense of  freedom of  indifference
(libertas indifferentiae).14 It is not choosing between alternatives, but deciding on
and sticking by the right kind of existential orientation that counts.  
(A)  The Aesthetic. The individual who has this orientation belongs to the
lowest level of human existence. He or she is taken with possibility and lost in
mere difference—plurality. Freedom is falsely thought to lie in choosing between
12Kierkegaard ironizes about wisdom (Klogskap),  prudence (Forstandighed),  the practical  (det
Praktiske).  Cf.  Gregor  Malantschuk,  Nøglebegreber  i  Søren  Kierkegaards  tænkning,
Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1993, pp. 74-5. “Practical reason” is never named. 
13Cf. SKS 3, 163-6 / EO2, 166-9.
14SKS 3, 169 / EO2, 173-4; SKS 4, 355 / CA, 49; SKS 19, 188 / KJN 3, 183.  
7
alternatives and then living these out. The medium in which the individual views
and relates to life in general is that of fantasy or imagination (abstraction). The
dominant mode of will here is desire, it seems, and because of this the individual
has no real regard for others either.15
(B)  The Ethical.  The aesthetic  individual  is  in  a  deeper  sense a mere
watcher  of  life,  indifferent  to  being  a  self.  The  ethical  person  by  contrast  is
engaged in bringing this self into actuality, recognizing her ties to others.16 There
is a shift here from willing variation to wanting some kind of stability in life. This is
will  of  a higher  power.  The first  form of  the ethical  is  more outward  looking,
concerned with conforming to social mores or institutions (such as marriage).17
With the second there is an inward turn, and only now does the person really
discover  that  she  has  a  self,  charged  with  the  task  of  becoming  a  single
individual.18 Ethical  will  is  bound  to  fail  in  this  though,  Kierkegaard  thinks,
because it is vainly trying to unify freedom and necessity in itself (that is, in moral
autonomy).  For  how  can  the  will  bind  itself  if  it  is  essentially  free  (that  is,
command and obey itself at the same time)? How can this kind of unity remain
anything but a thought? External compulsion is clearly needed if the self is to
become fully actual. To engage others in a serious way means risking one’s self-
sufficiency anyway: that is what it means to act.19
15Cf., for example, SKS 3, 163-4 / EO2, 166-7.
16Ibid.
17SKS 3, 43ff. / EO2, 36ff. 
18SKS 7, 505-10 / CUP1, 555-61.
19SKS 23, 45-6/ JP 1, 188. 
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(C) Religiousness A.20 The ethical stage reveals something new about the
will. As a freely-acting cause and a self-relation it is both spontaneous and free,
but  as  relational it  is  always  limited  by  something  beyond  itself.  The  self,
paradoxically, is a synthesis of freedom and necessity though that synthesis is
never achieved by the self alone.21 The will is not self-sufficient, which is to say it
is not perfect either. A truly serious engagement with the ethical is also bound to
involve  guilt-consciousness  (Skyld-bevidsthed)  on  some  level,  not  just  the
awareness that there is a gap between doing what is right and getting rewarded
for it  (happiness).22 And since none of us is a perfect being, this is bound at
some point to lead to  an appeal  to heaven.  The self  or  will  is  radically torn,
which marks the movement toward religion. The dominant mode of the will  at
this  stage  is  passion,  it  seems,  and  the  self  is  characterized  by  an
inward deepening here, leading in its highest power to resignation and a total
self-annihilation before the Divine.23
(D) Religiousness B.24 This is where Christianity comes in, a supernatural
or transcendent paradigm largely borrowed from Augustine.25 The will is not only
imperfect; it is positively sinful. That the will is corrupt is not something we can
figure  out  on  our  own,  however:  sin-consciousness  (Syndsbevidsthed),26 the
20Cf. SKS 7, 505-10 / CUP1, 555-61.
21Cf. SKS 11, 129-30 / SUD, 13-14. 
22For example, SKS 7, 477ff., 505-10 / CUP1, 525ff., 555-61.
23Ibid.
24Cf. SKS 7, 505-10 / CUP1. 555-61.
25Cf. Strand 2001.
26SKS 4, 411 / CA, 109.
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knowledge that before God one is always in the wrong, is something that has to
be revealed from above. The condition for becoming truly aware, turning one’s
will around, has to be given by the eternal God himself through the saving work
of Christ.27 Only through the God-man, this Absolute Paradox of the eternal in
history,  can  a  true  decision  be  reached:  either  be  transformed  and  made
whole again through self-annihilation and a leap to faith,28 or else remain caught
between  two  wills  (to  Villier),  two  minds  (Tvesindet),  stuck  forever  in  doubt
(Tvivl)  and  despair  (Fortvivlelse).29 The  latter  decision  is  at  bottom a  defiant
will  (trodsige  Villie)  against  God  for  Kierkegaard.30 The  first  is  something  to
be  realized  resolutely  through  a  lifetime.  The  chief  modes  of  the  will  here
are faith, hope, and love.31 
This raises a whole host of questions of course, the two most important being:
“How does the will become bad in the first place?” and “How does Christ help in
willing  only  the  good?”  In  The Concept  of  Anxiety  the  first  is  answered  by
claiming that though everyone born after  the first  man who sinned (Adam) is
predisposed to corruption, sin only actually enters by a qualitative leap of the
individual’s will. It is freedom itself, the sheer possibility of  being able, and the
27SKS 4, 258-71 / PF, 55-71.
28 SKS 4, 161-2 / FT, 69; SKS 7, 97 / CUP1, 98-9.
29 SKS 4, 430 / CA, 129; SKS 8, 144, 169 / UD, 30, 60. 
30 SKS 5, 123 / EUD, 118; SKS 11, 191-193 / SUD, 77-9.  
31 SKS 8, 203-5 / UD, 99-101.
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anxiety about and being overwhelmed by this that makes us guilty before God.32
But wouldn’t this only make sin something inevitable again, almost natural? If so,
how can it be fully voluntary? Is it possible not to sin? (Cf. (2)). Could either we or
Adam have willed otherwise here? (Cf. (3)). Haufniensis has to admit that it is all
very  mysterious.  Kierkegaard  himself  would  deny  that  God  predestines  or
discriminates. The leap of faith is still up to us even if sinning is not, and the
condition for the leap itself has to be given by Christ. For Kierkegaard, Christ is
also  an  example  to  be  imitated  in  life.  To  obey  the  will  of  God  and  suffer
everything for His sake; to love God with a resolute will by giving up all claims to
human autonomy and self-sufficiency; to forsake the many and become a single
individual: that is what it means to will only one thing—the good.33    
(E) Religiousness “C”?34 Kierkegaard is a Christian existentialist above all.
The basic point of convergence in the Kierkegaardian corpus is the God-relation.
The way the will is brought out conceptually is mainly a function of this. But the
Christian is not only commanded to love God with an undivided heart. It is also
said: “Love your neighbor as yourself.”35 But how can anyone do both at once?
According to Kierkegaard in  Works of Love this can be done by existing and
acting so that others may want to enter into the God-relation too. A right ordering
of the will means placing oneself on the same level as others, loving them for the
32SKS 4, 347-57 / CA, 41-51.
33SKS 8, 123, 157, 169, 182; 184ff., 227-37 / UD 7, 46, 60, 74, 76ff., 127-39.   
34Cf.  Merold  Westphal,  “Kierkegaard’s  Teleological  Suspension  of  Religiousness  B,”  in
Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, ed. by George B. Connell and C. Stephen
Evans, New Jersey: Humanities Press 1992, p. 114.
35Matthew 22:37-8.
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sake of the good. The God-relation comes first of course, so there cannot be talk
of  any concrete  or  real  dependence  on  others.36 And  as  deliberative  reason
cannot be said to have a positive role in second-order agency for Kierkegaard
(cf. (4)), there is no real place for it in human interactions either. There is not a
place for reciprocal love or willing in this picture. But though Kierkegaard has yet
to  come  up  with  a  full-blooded  social  or  political  model  of  the  will,  he  has
nevertheless given it a kind of sociality here.
In the The Sickness unto Death the self is defined as will, that is, as (1) a
synthesis of psyche and body (that is, spirit), (2) as that relation’s relating itself to
itself (in self-reflection and freedom), (3) as posited by and therefore inherently
relational and limited by something beyond itself. This is also why the will only
truly exists and reaches its full power when (4) it gives itself over to the absolute,
resting transparently in the power that posited it.37 (5) Nothing should ever be
allowed to  come between the will  and God.  This  could stand as a summary
definition of the concept of will in the Kierkegaardian corpus as a whole.
Narve Strand 
See  also  Anxiety;  Decision/Resolve;  Existence/Existential;  Desire;  Faith;
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Salvation/Eternal Happiness.
 
36SKS 9, 36-7, 51, 68 / WL, 29, 44, 61.
37SKS 11, 129, 161, 163-4 / SUD, 13, 46, 48-9.
12
